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Introduction
The German system of apprenticeship and vocational training is widely known throughout the world. It offers an attractive alternative to university-education for young people. In the classical apprenticeship system, young people enter a trilateral contract with a firm that employs them and trains their firm-specific skills and a vocational school that provides them with more general training. The contract runs for two to three years. After having passed the necessary examinations, apprentices are awarded an official diploma by the chamber of commerce.
Apprentices and firms can choose between more than 300 standardized professions (BIBB, 2014) or "occupational profiles". The syllabus for these professions are developed in a cooperation between the government, the labor unions and the potential employers (through the chambers of commerce). This ensures that apprentices develop a mix of general and firmspecific skills and thus are attractive for future employers. Compared to untrained workers, employees who successfully acquire apprenticeship training receive higher wages and are less likely to be unemployed (e.g. Schmidt, 2005) .
The apprenticeship system has been the subject of many studies by German scholars and scholars from outside Germany. Some authors focus on its impact on the productivity and industry structure (e.g. Bradley and Taylor, 1996; Mason et al., 1992) while others address the more general question why some countries have a comparable system while others do not (e.g., Soskice, 1994; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Harhoff and Kane, 1993) . Scholars from countries that do not have a comparable system have also discussed the question whether a system of a similar sort should be introduced to their country (e.g. Harhoff and Kane, 1993) .
So far, little attention has been paid to the political economy of this system. This paper contributes to closing this gap. It focusses on the mode of funding vocational schools. Funding comes from two sources: The state government provides teachers and pays for their salaries while the county governments cover the costs for the so-called "external school affairs". These comprise -among other things -the costs of building and maintaining school buildings and maintenance and administrative staff. In addition, counties provide the funding for the training facilities in vocational schools. Especially for technical professions, these facilities are quite expensive. In 2001, the average expenditures per pupil amounted to 802 Euros and the average total expenditures per county added up to almost 4.5 million Euros. On the one hand, wellequipped schools can provide higher quality training. In this sense, vocational schools may be an important location factor for firms. Thus, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that county governments use expenditures as an instrument in inter-regional competition for firms (e.g., Tiebout, 1956; Wilson 1986; Brueckner, 2003) . On the other hand, the counties' expenditures on vocational schools may create utility spillovers similar to those created by the German states' expenditures on higher education (e.g., Büttner/Schwager, 2004) . In this case, counties face incentives to free ride on the expenditures of their neighboring counties. So far, there is surprisingly little research on the spatial interaction in expenditures on vocational schools. In this paper, we provide -to the best of our knowledge -the first comprehensive study on this issue. Our main focus rests on the question: are counties' expenditures on vocational schools spatially related? Given the general lack of empirical studies on the political economy of vocational school funding, we take a somewhat explorative approach to learn more about factors driving county governments' expenditures on vocational schools in general.
We use panel data from German counties between 2001 and 2006 . In our analysis, we have to cope with unobserved heterogeneity between counties with respect to the portfolio of professions their vocational schools offer. We cope with this by applying a model with county fixed effects. Our results can be summarized as follows: We find no evidence for any spatial correlation in the counties expenditures for vocational schools, neither negative nor positive.
While the theoretical literature suggests that spendings should be higher for apprentices from small firms, we find a negative relationship between the share of apprentices from small firms and the expenditures per pupil. Expenditures per pupil increase in the share of Christian Democrats in the county council.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature. In section 3, we present the institutional background relevant for our study. Section 4 presents the data and the empirical strategy. Results are presented and discussed in section 5. In section 6, we provide concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.
Review of literature
There is a vast literature on the German apprenticeship system and vocational training in general, on regional (development) policies and on the factors driving local expenditures for primary and secondary schools. However, the literature emerged in three largely disjoint strands. Little has been written about the relationship between these fields. In this section, we briefly sketch the essential aspects of all three strands and point at possible links between them.
1) The German apprenticeship system
The German apprenticeship system has been analyzed by national but also by international scholars. Taking the existence of the system as given, some authors analyzed its contribution to the overall performance of the German economy. It is recognized to promote productivity especially in the industrial sector and to thereby play a significant role in making Germany attractive for industry settlements -despite its high wages and comparatively high degree of regulation (e.g. Thelen, 2007) . The system is also recognized to shape the distribution of income because it lets workers participate in the overall productivity progress of society -thereby opening the middle-class of society for people without university degree (e.g. bank clerk, industrial management assistant, assistant tax consultant, electrician). Starting in the 1990s, a number of authors address the question why this system exists in some countries like Germany or Austria while similar systems are missing in the UK or US (e. g. Harhoff/Kane, 1993 , Soskice, 1994 . They analyze the institutional and contractual arrangements of the system to learn more about the incentives of firms to train their employees. The essential question is: Why do firms pay for the vocational training of employees (while they usually do not pay for university education of their employees)? While it is not puzzling to have firms pay for firmspecific training, the question is: Why do they invest in the general skills of their apprentices and thereby reduce their monopsony power in negotiations with their apprentices? Soskice (1994) addresses this question in a theoretical model and arrives at the following conclusion: Depending on the imperfections on the labor market and the institutional settings in general, there are two possible equilibria. In the low-skill low-education equilibrium, employees receive little training and frequently change employer. The high-skill high-education equilibrium is characterized by a high degree of training and a low frequency of quits. The level of labor market imperfections and other institutional settings in Germany led to high-skill higheducation equilibrium (see also Harhoff and Kane, 1993) . Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) build on Soskice (1994) and develop a more sophisticated theoretical model of the firms' incentives to train. Essentially, firms have monopsony power (because of superior information) and pay more for training if quits are rare. If quits are high, a low amount of training is provided in equilibrium. They test the essential prediction of their model empirically using the change in the duration of military service in Germany as a natural experiment and find it supported.
2) Regional development policies
New Economic Geography tells us that the location decision of firms is strongly driven by agglomeration rents and network externalities. This makes it very difficult for governments especially in rural regions to promote regional development and prevent the outflow of mobile capital and high-skilled labor (e.g., Pflüger and Südekum, 2008) . Nevertheless, providing good infrastructure to firms is still one of the key instruments in regional development strategies.
Good vocational schools are likely to be one element of this firm-related public infrastructure.
While the importance of the apprenticeship system for regional economic development (labor market) is mentioned parenthetically, few authors place an emphasis on this relationship. One exception is a study by Bradley and Taylor (1996) . They analyze interactions between the vocational training system and the local economy in a theoretical model: The model suggests that the output of vocational training and the stock of high-skilled workers form a positive feedback loop. In addition, the number of high-skilled workers has a positive influence on local competitiveness and economic performance. Last but not least, a high level of economic performance has a positive impact on the qualification of immigrants and therefore again on human capital. Bradley and Taylor (1996) find support for the existence of these positive feedback effects in their empirical analysis for local England. Di Gioacchino and Profeta (2014) develop a two-sector model on lobbying for education, arguing rather the other way round:
They stress that the production structure and firms' political pressure activities influence education policy and therefore also the composition of human capital. The authors find that an optimal level of human capital can only be reached if lobbying is not too costly.
3) Local expenditures for primary and secondary education
There is a large body of literature on local/regional expenditures for primary and secondary education. Starting in the 1970s, a number of authors have analyzed the differences in per capita spending across US states and school districts (e.g., Denzau, 1975; Denzau and Grier, 1984; Poterba 1997) . These studies find empirical support for the notion that the interest group model of public spending holds for education expenditures: Public spending is lower if the share of population older than 65 years is higher (e.g., Miller, 1996; Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996) . In addition, expenditures per capita are found to depend on the per capita income (e.g., Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996) . Colburn and Horowitz (2003) For German counties, Schwarz and Weishaupt (2013) provide an analysis on the determinants of per student expenditures for primary schools. The variation between Länder can mostly be explained by differences concerning the school system and all-day care. In North RhineWestphalia, the unemployment rate has a significant negative effect on these expenditures. The expenditures are shown to be significantly and positively affected by the population density and the tax revenues of the communes in Bavaria whereas in Hesse, the population density seems to affect the latter negatively. All in all, the federal state is the most significant factor here.
Their study does not account for spatial analysis, nor for political variables.
There is a number of studies on subnational education expenditures in European countries. Freitag and Bühlmann (2003) try to explain the high variance in education expenditures among cantons in Switzerland in the 80s and 90s. Among other things, expenditures per capita positively depend on a high degree of urbanization, a low share of employment in the first sector, economic strength, a high graduation rate from Gymnasien and universities. The degree of decentralization (autonomy of municipalities) within the canton is found to have a negative impact.
4) Regional spillovers in funding education
Recently, a number of authors have addressed the question whether there is spatial interdependence in the expenditures on education. The theoretical literature suggests that these expenditures should be spatially correlated because public education creates spillovers. One strand of literature concentrates on higher education. Büttner and Schwager (2004) analyze the higher education spending decision of German states. They develop a theoretical model showing that students' mobility results in underinvestment. Using data on higher education expenditures by German states, they find a negative correlation between the expenditures of one state and those of its neighboring states. Poutvaara (2004) argues that the national incentives to invest in public education decrease as a result of labor mobility. He shows that graduate taxes or income-contingent loans (also from migrants) improve welfare compared to a situation where employment-based taxes are used to fund education All in all, the existing studies agree that decentralization in higher education financing leads to underinvestment and therefore underprovision if there is no private financial contribution at all (see also Justmann and Thisse, 1997). As vocational schools in Germany do not take any user fees, the same argument may apply to the expenditures for vocational education in Germany.
There is a number of studies that apply spatial econometrics to test for existence of spatial correlation in local expenditures on primary and secondary education. Spillovers are expected to be especially strong if parents are free in the choice of school for their children and they can choose to send them to another school district (see Rincke, 2006; Ghosh, 2010) . Ghosh (2010) uses a dataset for Massachusetts school districts and applies a Spatial Autoregressive Model and a Spatial Error Model. He takes expenditures per pupil, pupil-teacher ratio as well as a measure for the teachers' qualification as dependent variables. For expenditures per pupil, he finds positive neighborhood spillover effects. Negative spillovers from direct neighbors are found concerning the student-teacher ratio whereas no significant spillovers are found for the third dependent variable. Gu (2012) 
Institutional Background

The German apprenticeship system
The apprenticeship system in Germany is internationally (almost) unique. It offers the possibility for young people who finished secondary school to acquire a formal qualification certified in a Diploma without going to college or university. They can choose between more than 300 different professions like bank clerk, construction worker, mechanic, electrician, IT- The standard way for a young person to acquire an apprenticeship qualification is to fill a position as apprentice in a firm that is qualified to train him in the desired profession.
Apprentices sign a special contract with their employer. In this contract, the firm agrees to provide the apprentice with the necessary training in the practical parts of the profession and to give him the time off to visit the vocational school. The largest part of vocational schools are state-run schools. They offer courses in general skills and in the theoretical skills underlying his profession (e.g., material sciences, programming skills). The apprentice agrees to go through the training and to work for the firm in the rest of the time. Apprentices receive some pay but the amount is much lower than the pay of untrained workers.
Visiting the vocational schools is obligatory and costless. Apprentices usually attend a vocational school (Berufsschule) for 1-2 days per week. In most cases, they visit vocational schools that are located in the county where their firm is located or in neighboring counties. For some rather rare vocational programs, however, students may have to travel considerable distances for theoretical training. In this case, they usually receive block training. Depending on prior school education and profession, the time of apprenticeship is two to three years. The chambers of commerce are in charge of supervising the practical training within the firm and make sure that it complies with the agreed standards. They are also in charge of the final examination of apprentices in the practical elements of their education (Hippach-Schneider et al., 2007) . The apprenticeship contract usually ends after successfully completing the apprenticeship. Some apprentices are offered the prospect of a regular labor contract after successfully completing their training. The retention rate varies across firms and industries (e.g. Pfeifer et al., 2009) . In general, the retention rate is low in small firms and high in large firms (e. g. Pfeifer et al., 2009) . Given that labor market regulation in Germany is more restrictive for large firms than for small firms, this pattern of retention rates is in line with the logic put forth by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) .
For some professions, e.g. in the field of health care, the share of theoretical training is substantially larger. In these professions, apprentices usually do not have individual contracts with a training firm or other institution. Instead, they undergo three years of schooling in socalled Berufsfachschule (BFS) and receive practical training during internships outside schools.
The Berufsfachschule also offers full-time programs as well as preparatory classes for young people who did not manage to acquire an apprenticeship contract but hope to receive one in the future. The system of vocational schools in Germany is completed by the vocational grammar schools. These are basically full-time grammar schools where some (minor) subjects include vocational aspects. The successful graduation from this type of school gives the students a general university entrance qualification (KMK, 2014).
The role of German counties
The German constitution assigns the task of education to the states (Länder) while it delegates some of the tasks to the county level. Therefore it is necessary to take a closer look at the counties in Germany. As of 2001, 118 German cities served as municipality and county at the same time (so-called cities with county rights). Next to them, there are 367 rural counties (Landkreise) with an average population of 178.448 and an average number of 42 municipalities on their territory (in 2001). Hereafter, we will use the term county as generic term for both cities with county rights and rural counties. The German Constitution grants municipalities and counties the right to self-government (GG, art. 28(2)). Municipalities are granted substantial autonomy in their decision about how to fulfill their tasks and they have the right to raise local taxes (including the right to set a local tax multiplier). They account for 16.5 percent of total public expenditures (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016) . The German counties have much less autonomy. They are assigned a "twin role" placing them in charge of a) executing numerous
Länder laws (such as the exterior school issues for vocational schools or local social security benefits) and b) providing supra-municipal goods and services (e.g. county hospitals, county roads, waste management etc.). Furthermore, they give support to financially weak local municipalities to guarantee an equal provision of local public goods and services within the The county parliament (Kreistag) is elected by the citizens of the county to represent them in all affairs settled on county level. It is enabled to enact statutes and can be seen as the legislative body of the county (Jann /Bogumil 2009). The so-called Landrat is the head of the county's government and administration at the same time (e.g., Jann and Bogumil; Fuchs 2012) . He is accountable to the Kreistag when it comes to fulfilling tasks assigned to the county level and accountable to the state government when it comes to delegated tasks. Finally, there is the Kreisausschuss which is basically a committee created by the Kreistag as supervisory authority.
On the revenue side, counties rely to some extend on vertical grants while they do not have tax autonomy. However, they have one source of revenues for which they can influence the size by setting a rate. This is the so-called Kreisumlage. The Kreisumlage defines a share of "regular municipal revenues" that the county can extract from the budgets of its municipalities. The taxrate (so-called Umlagesatz) is set by the county council in a simple majority vote. The municipalities' approval is not needed. The higher the Kreisumlage-rate, the more municipal fiscal capacity the county is taxing away (see also Seele 1990 , Fuchs 2012 , Henneke 2012 ).
The formal responsibility for vocational schools rests with the German Länder. They are in charge of the so-called interior school issues. I.o.W. they employ the teaching staff and pay for their salaries. In addition, they develop the curricula (in accordance with the nationwide regulations negotiated with the chambers of commerce). The counties are in charge of the exterior school issues and have to provide funding for non-teaching staff, after school care, buildings, school equipment, administrative costs etc.
In most counties, vocational training is concentrated in a few, large school centers. These school centers often encompass different types of vocational schools that share facilities and staff. For this reason, it is impossible to determine how much resources flow into which branch of vocational schooling. Hereafter, we will use the term vocational pupils as umbrella term for all pupils in the system of vocational schools, regardless of school branch. The term apprentice is used for those pupils with a labor and training contract with a private firm who visit a Berufsschule. In 2001, the share of pupils in vocational grammar school (Fachgymnasiasten) among all vocational pupils was about 4 percent on average, whereas the share of pupils in BFS accounted for 17 to 18 percent. The share of the remaining types of vocational students is negligibly small. Thus, the by far largest part of pupils in the vocational system are apprentices trained in the classical apprenticeship system described above. Our primary focus rests on these apprentices.
Given the large number of more than 300 professions for which apprenticeship contracts can be signed, it is obvious that not all counties can offer the relevant vocational school classes in all these professions (so-called Fachklassen). Instead, most counties only offer a limited amount of Fachklassen. Firms and apprentices in a certain county i can still sign an apprenticeship contract for a profession not offered by the vocational schools of their county. In this case, the apprentice has to visit a vocational school in a different county. For frequent professions, it is often possible to find the adequate Fachklasse in the neighboring county. Apprentices of rare professions may have travel substantial distances for vocational school training. The regional distribution of Fachklassen is settled by the state -after consulting the regional chambers of commerce and the counties'. It seems reasonable to assume that some types of vocational training are more expensive per student than others. For instance, technical apprenticeships which include apprenticeship workshops cause higher (material) costs than those without apprenticeship workshops (Pfeifer et al., 2009 ). We will control for these differences by introducing county fixed effects.
The cities with county rights play an important role in providing vocational training for the less densely populated counties in the region. Frequently, the counties also open their training classes to apprentices from these cities. Generally speaking, however, the exchange is unbalanced with the cities receiving more outside students than they send to the surrounding counties. In most states, vocational schools receive a fixed grant per student from outside covering some of the variable costs (see Avenarius and Heckel 2000) .
[ Table 1 : about here] Table 1 provides information on the number of schools and the structure students for the WestGerman Landkreise and cities with county rights which are included in our dataset. The average number of Berufsschulen is 6.5 in the Landkreise and 8.7 in the cities with county rights. The vocational schools in Landkreise have only about 10 percent guest students while this share is close to 30 percent for the cities with county rights. On the other hand, the share of Berufsfachschüler and Fachgymnasiatsen is substantially larger in the Landkreise. The share of non-German pupils in vocational schools is higher in cities with county rights.
Data and hypotheses
We use data on all counties in the West- German respectively 125.000 inhabitants on average). At the same time, we find substantial differences between Landkreise and cities with county rights in other categories. Cities with county rights have higher unemployment rates and more debt per capita. In addition, the share of non-German population is larger. Regarding industry structure, cities with county rights have a higher share of employees in the service and production sector while the construction sector is larger in the Lankreise. In addition, the share of employees working in large firms (>250 employees) is substantially larger in cities with county rights while Landkreise have a higher share of employees working in small firms (< 10 employees). A similar pattern is observed for the distribution of apprentices across firms of different size: The share of apprentices working in large firms (>250 employees) is substantially larger in cities with county rights while
Landkreise have a higher share of apprentices working in small firms (< 10 employees). It is important to note that these shares refer to the location of the apprentices' firms rather than the location of the vocational schools they visit.
[ Table 2 here] Looking at the counties' annual expenditures on vocational schools per pupil, we find substantial differences between Landkreise and cities with county rights. Due to the higher degree of decentralization, the figures are three to four times larger in Bavaria than in the other West-German counties. At the same time Landkreise spend substantially more (950 € per pupil and year in West-Germany excluding Bavaria, 4950 € in Bavaria), the figure for cities with county rights is substantially lower (550 € and 1550 €). In addition, we find substantial variation in per pupil expenditures within both groups. Similar within-and between-variations exist for the expenditures per inhabitant. Figure 1 shows that there is no trend in the average expenditures.
[ Figure 1 here] County governments have limited influence on the number of schools on their territory or the educational program these schools offer. These facts are negotiated with the state government.
On the other hand, county governments can influence the quality of vocational schooling by spending more on equipment and activities. We argue that spending more funds on vocational schools is not a sign of inefficiency or waste but rather an indication that a county is investing more in the general skills of their vocational pupils. Our main research question focusses on the spatial interaction of counties. The literature on interjurisdictional competition suggests that local and regional governments compete for mobile capital. Offering well-equipped vocational schools may be one instrument in this competition. The empirical literature has compiled evidence for the existence of both tax competition and expenditure competition (e.g., Brueckner, 2003) . In addition, the big stake-holders in vocational training in Germany -governments, labor unions and the chambers of commerce -argue that the existence of a wellequipped vocational school nearby is an essential argument in firm's location choice. We test for spatial correlation in the counties' expenditures on vocational schools. Thus, hypothesis H1 reads:
H1: The spatial correlation in countries' expenditures on vocational schools is positive.
On the other hand, some of the studies literature reviewed in section 2 suggest that good vocational schools may generate positive utility spillovers for the neighboring jurisdictions just like higher education institutions on state level do. These in turn may create the incentives to free ride on the expenditures of their neighboring municipalities. Thus, hypothesis H1A reads:
H1A: The spatial correlation in countries' expenditures on vocational schools is negative.
Empirical analysis
Empirical models
Our main aim is to test for the existence of spatial correlation in the counties' expenditures for vocational schools. Following the literature on education expenditures, we use the expenditures per pupil as dependent variable. This is the most direct way to capture possible differences in the quality of vocational schools -as influenced by the county government.
Moran's I-test provides a first indication for the existence of special correlation (e.g., Anselin et al. 1996) . The tests are performed year-wise for the years 2003 to 2006 using a rowstandardized contiguity matrix as well as a contiguity matrix with relative weights proportional to the inverse geographical distances (see table 3 ). The significantly positive coefficients for West-Germany suggest that there is positive spatial correlation between counties' expenditures on vocational schools as hypothesized in H1. However, the coefficient may also reflect the presence of common factors such as state regulation driving the counties' expenditures.
Therefore, a more thorough empirical analysis is needed.
[ 
We use the two different spatial weighting matrices (W) mentioned above to capture the spatial relations between counties: First, we use the conventional row-standardized contiguity matrix.
Second, we use the contiguity matrix with relative weights proportional to the inverse geographical distances.
Next, we have to specify the matrix X of covariates driving the counties' per capita expenditures on vocational schools. As this is the first large-scale empirical study on vocational education expenditures in Germany, it is worthwhile to pay some attention to their influence despite the fact that the primary focus rests elsewhere. Third, we control for the share of non-German pupils in the counties' vocational schools. The need for training among these apprentices may be higher because of deficiencies e.g. in the knowledge of the German language and to help these pupils overcome possible discrimination of non-Germans in the job market. These arguments point at a positive relationship between the share of non-German pupils and the expenditures per pupil. On the other hand, one might argue that non-German pupils have less voting power than German pupils because they themselves and their parents are often not allowed to vote in local elections. This points at a negative relationship. The net effect is unclear ex ante.
Fourth, we account for the share of guest-students, i.e. students coming from other counties to visit the resident vocational schools. We expect the county government to be less interested in providing good education to guest students compared to their own resident students.
In addition, we introduce a number of additional control variables. To capture differences in the counties' general economic and fiscal situation, we include the disposable income per capita and the unemployment rate (based on the whole civilian labor force)] and accumulated public debt per capita. Following the literature on expenditures for primary and secondary schooling (see section 2), we control for share of non-German population and for the county's age composition. The larger the share of old persons, the higher the demand for consumption expenditures as opposed to investment (including human capital formation). We also control for possible economies of scale or scope by introducing the number of apprentices per 1000 inhabitants directly.
Finally, we have to account for the fact that the counties differ in relative importance of school types and they also differ in the specific professions their vocational schools offer training in (Fachklassen, see section 3.2). We have to control for these sources of heterogeneity in the costs of vocational training. To cover differences in the share of pupils in different school branches, we control for the share of pupils in Berufsfachschulen and the share of pupils in Fachgymnasien (see table 1 , section 3.2). Controlling for these shares allows us to place our focus on expenditures per apprentice in the classical apprenticeship system, namely the students with a formal labor contract who train for a profession and receive part of the training in the Berufsschule while the largest share of training takes place outside the school. For all the independent variables, lagged values from the previous year are used. We take the natural logarithm of all continuous variables (except for dummy variables and variable representing percentage shares).
Finally, we introduce county fixed effects to control for the remaining unobserved heterogeneity. Most importantly, this controls for the likely difference in expenditures that result from differences in the necessary training facilities needed for training particular professions. These differences may be substantial because there is a significant degree of division of labor between counties (see section 3.2). Fixed effects are an adequate way of coping with the unobservable differences in training facilities needed across counties because the structure of schools and classes is quite stable in our period of observation. Year fixed effects control for common changes across time.
Result for West Germany (excluding Bavaria)
We start by analyzing the panel of West German counties excluding Bavaria. The results are presented in table 4. The first column presents regression results using the full set of variables described above and the conventional contiguity matrix. In column 2, we rerun the regressions from column 1 using a contiguity matrix with spatial weights inversely proportional to the distance to the neighboring counties. Column 3 and 4 use the same covariates and W-matrices as columns 1 and 2 respectively but apply a Spatial Error Model (SEM). Unlike the SAR-model, the SEM-model contains a spatially autocorrelated error term instead of a spatially-lagged dependent variable.
[ Table 4 about here]
The results in all four columns are qualitatively identical. Contrary to our prediction, we find the share of apprentices in small firms to be significantly negative. Per capita expenditures on vocational schools increase in the share of Christian Democratic council members but decrease in the share of guest students. We find a negative relationship between the share of apprentices in total population and the expenditures on vocational schools per pupil. Regardless of the specification, we find no evidence that there is any spatial correlation. The corresponding parameter λ is far from significant.
In a sensitivity analysis, we use a Spatial Durbin Model (SDM, see Table 5 ). It is less restrictive in its assumptions and allows for spatially lagged explanatory variables in addition to the spatially lagged dependent variable (see e.g., Le Sage 2014, Ajilore 2013). This allows for the possibility that counties also take into account other characteristics of neighboring counties aside from their expenditures on vocational schools when making their own expenditure decisions. The results are qualitatively identical to those of the SAR-model (see column 5-8).
Most importantly, it provides no evidence for spatial correlation in expenditures on vocational schools. The fact that most coefficients in the column Wx are insignificant provides additional support for the notion that the politics and the general situation in neighboring counties have little influence on the expenditures on vocational schools in German counties.
1
[ Table 5 about here]
Result for Bavaria
We replicate the empirical analysis above using a panel on Bavaria only (see Appendix for full descriptive statistics). Despite the considerable institutional differences mentioned above, many of our results hold for Bavaria as well (see table 6/ 7): Per capita expenditures also increase in the share of Christian Social council members and decrease in the share of guest students.
Furthermore, we do not find any evidence of spatial correlation either. Nevertheless, there are some notable differences: The share of apprentices in small companies is insignificant for
Bavaria. The share of apprentices in big companies, on the other hand, is found to have a significantly positive effect on per capita expenditures for vocational schools. Moreover, we find no significant impact of the share of apprentices in total population. Last but not least, expenditures per pupil increase in the share of foreigners in total population, but seem to decrease in the share of foreign apprentices.
[ Table 6 and 7 about here] 1
As another sensitivity analysis, we also controlled for the square of the apprentices' share of population to test if economies of scale exist. However, the latter specification does not change our results qualitatively.
Moreover, we once included a dummy variable on whether any far-right party (NPD, DVU or Republicans) has at least one seat in the county council -not significantly changing any of our results. The same holds true for an introduction of sectoral dummy variables.
Concluding remarks
The German system of apprenticeship has been analyzed in numerous theoretical and empirical studies. So far, the focus rests on the impact of the system on labor market outcomes, industry performance and income distribution. The political economy of this system has been largely ignored. In this paper, we provide -to the best of our knowledge -the first large-scale empirical analysis of the factors driving local expenditures on education in public vocational schools. Our results indicate that political factors matter. We find expenditures to be higher in counties with a large share of Christian Democrats (or Christian Social Party members) in the county council.
The counties' firm structure drives the counties' expenditures for vocational schools. While the results differ for Bavaria and the rest of West-Germany, they support the same bottom line:
Small firms seem to have less political influence than large firms. All models reported above show a negative relationship between the share of guest students and per capita expenditures.
This supports the notion that county governments care less for their apprentices from firms located outside their constituency. Somewhat surprisingly, the fiscal or economic situation is not found to matter. Nor do we find evidence for an opportunistic budged cycle in vocational school expenditures.
Above all, we are interested in the relationship between vocational expenditures in neighboring counties: Is there any evidence for inter-county competition? Moran's I test suggests that this may be the case for the West-German sample (excluding Bavaria). We apply spatial econometric regression techniques to test for spatial correlation in counties' expenditures for vocational schools. Regardless of the specification, we find no evidence that hints at spatial correlation. This indicates that there is no inter-county competition for mobile capital in the field of vocational schooling. Alternatively, one may argue that there are two spatial effects neutralizing each other. On the one hand, counties may compete with each other for mobile capital and jobs through the provision of good vocational training. On the other hand, counties may free ride on the vocational schools provided by the neighboring counties. In particular, the proximity to a city with county rights may provide incentives for counties to free ride on their vocational schools -a strategy that is not available for counties far away from cities with county rights. With the given data set, it is impossible to differentiate between the absence of spatial interaction and the existence of two countervailing spatial effects. Further research is needed.
Any further research in this field faces one essential challenge: the division of labor between counties in training the regional apprentices. This division of labor means that different counties may have different per capita costs of providing vocational training just because some specialize on professions that require more expensive training than others. We control for this by introducing county fixed effects. While this largely solves the main challenge, it bears a high price because several interesting questions regarding the funding of vocational training cannot be answered. For instance, it is impossible to test whether the internal composition of counties -i.e. their municipal structure -drives their funding decisions. These analyses have to be left for the future when a suitable proxy for the heterogeneity in profession-specific training costs is found. Once this data is available, it may also be possible to test another explanation for the absence of spatial correlation: Accordingly, the lack of spatial correlation may result from the fact that the division of labor between counties is deliberately designed as a form of collusion that prevents inter-county competition. The recent paper by Di Liddo and Giuranno (2016) suggests that this may be the case. 
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